JD GLOBAL MEDIA | SOUTH AFRICA
Published: 21 September 2026
ELECTION INFORMATION BECOMES A NEW BATTLEGROUND
South Africa's electoral authorities are warning voters to be increasingly cautious about information circulating online as the country moves towards the 4 November 2026 Local Government Elections, with artificial intelligence, fake accounts, manipulated images and false voting information emerging as particular concerns.
The Electoral Commission of South Africa has issued guidance explaining how voters can identify potentially misleading election material, including AI-generated photographs, manipulated videos, fabricated announcements and false claims about voting procedures.
The warning comes at a critical point in the electoral timetable. Special-vote applications opened on 21 September, political parties are preparing to sign the Electoral Code of Conduct on 23 September, and the country is moving into an increasingly active campaign period.
The IEC's concern is not simply about ordinary political disagreement.
The commission distinguishes between legitimate political criticism, opinion and debate and information deliberately created or distributed to mislead people and cause harm.
A new Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation has already been introduced for the 2026 local elections, and the commission says political parties and candidates must comply with the new requirements.
The code is effective from 4 September 2026 until the election results are declared.
AI-GENERATED CONTENT IS A PARTICULAR CONCERN
Artificial intelligence has made it easier to create convincing photographs, audio recordings and videos that appear authentic even when they are not.
The IEC is warning voters that manipulated material can be used to create false impressions about political parties, candidates, election officials or the voting process.
The commission's latest guidance advises voters to look carefully at photographs and videos for signs of manipulation.
Possible warning signs include unnatural movements, unusual hands, inconsistent lighting, blurred edges and other visual abnormalities.
However, voters are also being encouraged not to rely on visual inspection alone.
As AI-generated material becomes increasingly sophisticated, some fabricated content may appear realistic enough that ordinary users cannot determine its authenticity simply by looking at it.
The IEC therefore recommends checking the source of information and comparing claims with official electoral information and credible news reporting.
FAKE VOTING INFORMATION COULD CAUSE DIRECT HARM
One of the commission's specific concerns involves false information about the mechanics of voting.
This could include fabricated claims about election dates, voting times, voting stations or who is eligible to vote.
Such information can have consequences even if it appears to be a simple social-media post.
A voter who receives incorrect information about the location of a voting station, for example, could arrive at the wrong place.
A person who believes a false claim about voting eligibility could decide not to participate.
False information about election dates could also cause voters to miss important deadlines.
The IEC has therefore urged voters to verify election information through official channels before sharing it with other people.
THE NEW DISINFORMATION CODE
The IEC formally promulgated its Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections on 4 September.
The code forms part of the Electoral Code of Conduct governing the 2026 local elections.
Its purpose is to strengthen election integrity and promote free, fair and orderly elections while addressing false or misleading information that could interfere with the electoral process.
Importantly, the code does not treat every controversial political statement as disinformation.
The framework protects lawful criticism, opinion, commentary, fair reporting, satire, parody and legitimate democratic debate where those forms of expression fall within protected speech.
That distinction is important in an election because political campaigns naturally involve disagreement.
Parties and candidates can criticise one another.
Journalists can report on political controversies.
Citizens can express opinions about policies and candidates.
The rules are aimed specifically at disinformation covered by the electoral framework rather than ordinary political debate.
WHAT DOES THE IEC MEAN BY DISINFORMATION?
The election framework distinguishes disinformation from ordinary mistakes.
Disinformation generally refers to false, inaccurate or misleading information that is deliberately created, presented or promoted with the intention of causing public harm.
This differs from misinformation, where false information may be shared without the person distributing it knowing that it is false.
The distinction can be difficult to establish in practice because determining someone's intention can require examination of the circumstances surrounding the content.
That is one reason the election framework provides a formal complaint and assessment process.
Rather than expecting voters to decide every case themselves, suspected election disinformation can be reported for assessment.
POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND AI CONTENT
The IEC's guidance also addresses political advertising and synthetic content.
AI-generated political material must be appropriately labelled under the disinformation framework.
The commission has warned that synthetic content can be used to give voters a false impression that a candidate said or did something when the person did not.
This could involve fabricated audio, manipulated video or an AI-generated image presented as genuine.
The issue becomes particularly sensitive during election campaigns because voters may encounter political material outside traditional media organisations.
A fabricated video can potentially spread through WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok, X, Instagram and other platforms before its authenticity is examined.
By the time a correction is issued, the original material may already have reached a large audience.
FAKE ACCOUNTS AND BOT NETWORKS
Another concern identified by the IEC involves fake social-media accounts and networks designed to make particular political claims appear more popular than they really are.
An account may appear to represent an ordinary citizen while actually being created to distribute coordinated political content.
Similarly, automated or coordinated accounts can potentially generate large numbers of interactions around particular posts.
The purpose of such activity can be to create the appearance of widespread public support for a particular claim.
The IEC is therefore encouraging voters to examine the account behind information rather than judging credibility solely by the number of likes, comments or shares.
A post with thousands of interactions is not automatically accurate.
Likewise, a claim that appears repeatedly across different accounts is not necessarily independently verified if those accounts are sharing the same original material.
HOW VOTERS CAN CHECK A SUSPICIOUS CLAIM
The IEC's advice begins with a basic question: Where did the information come from?
Voters are encouraged to identify the original source of a claim rather than relying on screenshots or forwarded messages.
They can then compare the information with official IEC announcements and credible reporting.
If an election-related announcement claims that a voting date has changed, for example, voters should check whether the IEC has actually announced such a change.
If a post claims that a particular person is an IEC official, voters can check the commission's official communication channels rather than assuming the claim is genuine.
The same principle applies to alleged election results, candidate disqualifications, voting-station changes and other important announcements.
PAUSE BEFORE SHARING
The IEC is also encouraging people to pause before sharing content designed to provoke a strong emotional reaction.
Posts that are designed to make people extremely angry, frightened or anxious can spread rapidly because users share them before checking whether the underlying claim is accurate.
The commission recommends taking a moment to verify such claims.
This is particularly relevant in political campaigns, where emotionally charged material can attract more attention than detailed policy discussions.
A message that claims an election has been cancelled, that a voting station has been closed or that a particular group has been banned from voting could spread rapidly if users share it without checking.
The IEC's guidance is therefore based partly on slowing down the sharing process.
REVERSE-IMAGE SEARCHES CAN HELP
For suspicious photographs, the IEC recommends using reverse-image search tools.
These can help determine whether an image has appeared previously in a different context.
An old photograph can sometimes be presented as a new event.
A photograph from another country can be falsely described as showing an incident in South Africa.
A genuine photograph can also be altered and circulated alongside a false description.
Reverse-image searches do not automatically establish the truth of every claim, but they can provide useful evidence about where an image originated and whether it has previously been used in another context.
CHECK THE SOCIAL-MEDIA ACCOUNT
The commission also recommends examining the account that posted suspicious information.
A newly created account with little history may warrant additional scrutiny.
So may an account whose name closely resembles that of an official institution but is not actually affiliated with it.
The IEC has previously warned about the misuse of its name and branding in political campaigning.
In June, the commission said political parties, candidates, campaign teams and supporters were not permitted to use the IEC's name, logo, designs or other intellectual property for election campaign purposes.
That warning illustrates why voters should distinguish between genuine electoral communications and material merely designed to look official.
FAKE IEC ANNOUNCEMENTS
A particularly sensitive category is fabricated communication appearing to come from the Electoral Commission.
The IEC's current guidance specifically warns about fake statements or announcements attributed to the commission or its employees.
This could include fake notices announcing changes to voting dates, fake election results, false claims about candidate eligibility or fraudulent job advertisements using the IEC's name.
The danger is that official-looking material can appear credible even when it has not been issued by the commission.
Voters should therefore verify important election announcements through the IEC's established communication channels.
THE REAL411 REPORTING SYSTEM
The IEC has designated Real411 as the platform for reporting suspected election-related disinformation.
The system is available to members of the public, political parties, candidates and organisations.
Complaints can involve alleged disinformation targeting the electoral process, contestants, the IEC or its staff.
Real411 operates a digital complaints process through a Digital Complaints Committee.
Its election platform says complaints are independently assessed and that outcomes are communicated through the established process.
The platform also provides an archive of election-related complaints from previous South African election cycles.
PARTIES AND CANDIDATES HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES
The new framework does not place responsibility only on ordinary voters.
Political parties and candidates also have obligations.
The IEC says parties and candidates must report instances of online disinformation to Real411 within 36 hours of becoming aware of them.
They are also expected to promote awareness of the Disinformation Code among their members and supporters and support wider media-literacy and voter-education efforts.
This creates an additional responsibility for campaign organisations.
Political parties have large networks of supporters and volunteers who can rapidly distribute campaign content.
The code therefore places obligations on parties and candidates to help prevent the spread of election-related disinformation.
FALSE INFORMATION ABOUT THE IEC IS ALSO COVERED
The disinformation framework specifically addresses content targeting the electoral commission and its staff.
This is significant because public confidence in an election depends partly on confidence in the institutions administering it.
False allegations about voting procedures, election officials or the commission could potentially undermine trust in the electoral process.
The code therefore requires parties and candidates to address disinformation targeting the IEC and its staff.
At the same time, legitimate criticism of the commission remains protected where it falls within lawful political expression.
That distinction means criticism and disinformation should not automatically be treated as the same thing.
FREE SPEECH REMAINS PART OF THE FRAMEWORK
The IEC has specifically stated that the Disinformation Code protects lawful criticism, opinion, commentary, fair reporting, satire, parody and legitimate democratic debate.
This provision matters because election periods naturally involve intense political discussion.
Citizens may disagree with the IEC.
Political parties may challenge electoral decisions.
Journalists may report on controversies.
Candidates may criticise opponents.
The existence of the Disinformation Code does not eliminate those forms of political expression.
The purpose is to address defined forms of false or misleading content that fall within the framework while preserving protected speech.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A COMPLAINT?
A member of the public can submit an election-related complaint to the digital complaints system.
The complaint is then assessed through the established process.
Real411 explains that its Digital Complaints Committee includes legal, media and digital expertise through its various structures.
Complaints can be submitted by members of the public and are considered according to the applicable framework.
The process is designed to provide a mechanism for dealing with digital harms without requiring individual voters to determine the final legal status of disputed content.
This is particularly important because some online claims can be difficult to assess without specialist knowledge.
WHAT PENALTIES ARE POSSIBLE?
The Disinformation Code forms part of the Electoral Code of Conduct.
The IEC therefore says contraventions are subject to the sanctions applicable to breaches of the Electoral Code of Conduct.
Depending on the circumstances and the applicable legal process, possible sanctions can include formal warnings and financial penalties.
The IEC's current guidance also lists more serious potential consequences, including restrictions on political activities or advertising, exclusion from a voting station, reduction of votes cast in favour of a party or candidate, disqualification of a candidature and cancellation of a party's registration.
These are legal mechanisms rather than automatic penalties for every complaint.
A complaint must be assessed and handled through the applicable process before a sanction can be imposed.
THE CODE REMAINS IN FORCE UNTIL RESULTS ARE DECLARED
The new Disinformation Code took effect on 4 September 2026.
It remains in force until the official declaration of the election results.
This means its operation covers the campaign period, election day and the period leading to the declaration of results.
The timing is significant because the volume of election-related information is expected to increase as 4 November approaches.
The rules will therefore remain relevant throughout the most active stages of the election.
23 SEPTEMBER WILL BE ANOTHER IMPORTANT DATE
Political parties contesting the elections are scheduled to sign the Electoral Code of Conduct on 23 September.
The signing ceremony will include a public commitment to comply with the electoral framework, including the Disinformation Code.
The date also coincides with the scheduled ballot-paper draw.
That means the election process will move through another major administrative and political milestone later this week.
The ceremony will reinforce the standards expected of political parties and candidates during the campaign.
THE ELECTION IS ALREADY GENERATING LARGE AMOUNTS OF CONTENT
The scale of the 2026 municipal election makes the information challenge particularly significant.
The IEC has certified 136,790 candidates to contest seats across South Africa's municipalities.
The candidates include party nominees for ward and proportional-representation contests as well as independent ward candidates.
The election covers eight metropolitan municipalities, 44 district municipalities and 205 local municipalities.
With thousands of candidates, hundreds of municipalities and numerous political parties participating, voters will encounter a large amount of election-related material.
That creates an environment in which accurate information can compete with rumours, manipulated content and political claims.
LOCAL POLITICS CREATES A PARTICULAR CHALLENGE
Municipal elections are different from national elections because many political issues are highly local.
A false claim can be designed around a specific ward, municipality, councillor or local service-delivery issue.
For example, manipulated content could falsely claim that a particular municipal official has made a statement or that a local voting station has been moved.
Because the content concerns a specific community, it can appear more believable to people who recognise the location or individuals shown.
The concern over hyper-local disinformation has already been raised by the IEC in discussions about the 2026 elections.
Generative AI makes it easier to create convincing material tailored to particular communities.
WHATSAPP PRESENTS AN ADDITIONAL CHALLENGE
Election information does not circulate only through public social-media pages.
Private messaging platforms can also play an important role in distributing political material.
A message forwarded through a family group, community group or neighbourhood chat can reach many people without the original source being immediately visible.
Screenshots can also remove important context.
A user may receive an image showing what appears to be an official announcement without knowing who originally created it.
This makes source verification particularly important.
The fact that a message was forwarded by someone personally known to the recipient does not establish that the underlying information is genuine.
POLITICAL CONTENT CAN BE MANIPULATED WITHOUT BEING COMPLETELY FABRICATED
Not all misleading material needs to be entirely invented.
A genuine photograph can be paired with a false caption.
A real speech can be edited so that important context is removed.
An authentic video can be presented as if it occurred at a different time or place.
A genuine statement can be selectively quoted to create a misleading impression.
These forms of manipulation can be more difficult to detect than completely fabricated material because part of the content may be genuine.
Voters are therefore encouraged to check the surrounding context rather than focusing only on whether an image or video looks real.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ERROR AND DELIBERATE DECEPTION
The distinction between misinformation and disinformation is important in the new electoral framework.
A person may unknowingly share an inaccurate claim because they believed it to be true.
That is different from deliberately creating a false claim with the intention of misleading people.
The intention behind content can nevertheless be difficult to establish.
That is why the complaint process considers the circumstances surrounding a claim rather than simply asking whether the information is correct or incorrect.
The framework is intended to address harmful digital content while maintaining space for legitimate expression.
VOTERS ARE PART OF THE RESPONSE
The IEC's message is that combating election disinformation is not solely the responsibility of government institutions.
Voters can also reduce its spread.
The basic steps are straightforward:
Check the source.
Compare the claim with official information.
Look for independent confirmation.
Examine suspicious photographs and videos.
Be cautious with newly created or suspicious accounts.
Avoid immediately forwarding emotionally charged claims.
Report suspected election disinformation through the appropriate channels.
These actions can reduce the speed at which false information moves through communities.
THE ROLE OF MEDIA LITERACY
The IEC is also promoting media literacy as part of the response.
Media literacy involves understanding how information is produced, distributed and manipulated.
For voters, this can mean recognising that an attractive graphic is not necessarily an official announcement, a viral post is not necessarily accurate and a video is not necessarily evidence of the event it claims to show.
The ability to verify information becomes particularly important during elections because political material is often designed to attract immediate attention.
THE IEC'S BROADER ELECTION PREPARATIONS CONTINUE
The disinformation framework is being implemented alongside the commission's other election preparations.
Special-vote applications opened on 21 September and will close at 5pm on 12 October.
Approved special votes will be cast on 2 and 3 November, before the main election on 4 November.
The IEC is also preparing for the ballot-paper draw and Code of Conduct ceremony on 23 September.
These deadlines mean voters need to distinguish between genuine election announcements and false information about the timetable.
WHY THE WARNING MATTERS NOW
The election campaign is becoming increasingly active.
Political parties are holding rallies, releasing policy positions and communicating directly with voters.
At the same time, millions of South Africans use social-media and messaging platforms every day.
That combination creates a large environment for political information to circulate.
The IEC's warning is therefore aimed at preventing false information from becoming embedded in the election process before voters have an opportunity to verify it.
THE BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTION AND POLITICAL DEBATE
The introduction of the Disinformation Code also creates a need for careful application.
An election cannot function properly if voters are prevented from hearing criticism or alternative political arguments.
At the same time, deliberately fabricated claims about voting procedures or candidates can interfere with informed participation.
The IEC has therefore expressly preserved protected speech within the code.
The challenge is applying the framework consistently so that legitimate political debate remains protected while genuinely harmful disinformation is addressed.
The formal complaints and assessment system is intended to provide a process for making those distinctions.
WHAT SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD WATCH FOR BEFORE 4 NOVEMBER
As election day approaches, voters may encounter claims concerning:
Changes to voting dates.
Changes to voting stations.
Candidate disqualifications.
Alleged IEC announcements.
Fake election results.
Fabricated political endorsements.
AI-generated speeches or videos.
Manipulated photographs.
False claims about voting eligibility.
Fake job advertisements using the IEC's identity.
Coordinated fake accounts.
Unlabelled synthetic political advertising.
The presence of any of these characteristics does not automatically prove that a piece of content is false.
It does, however, provide a reason to verify the information before sharing it.
THE FINAL MESSAGE FROM THE IEC
The electoral commission's warning comes down to a basic principle: voters should not treat every piece of information appearing online as verified simply because it looks professional or has been shared widely.
AI tools can produce convincing material.
Social-media algorithms can amplify sensational claims.
Fake accounts can create the appearance of public support.
Old photographs can be presented as new.
Real videos can be edited or taken out of context.
And fabricated election announcements can look official.
The IEC is therefore encouraging South Africans to slow down, verify information and use established reporting channels when they encounter suspicious material.
The commission's new Disinformation Code will remain in force through the election period, while Real411 provides a mechanism for reporting suspected violations.
The responsibility for protecting the integrity of the election consequently extends beyond election officials.
Political parties, candidates, journalists, civil-society organisations and ordinary voters all form part of the information environment surrounding the election.
South Africa is now moving into one of the busiest phases of the 2026 municipal election campaign.
With 4 November approaching and more than 136,000 candidates contesting seats across the country's municipalities, the amount of political information circulating online is likely to increase.
The challenge will be ensuring that voters can distinguish political opinion from factual information, legitimate criticism from fabricated claims and genuine electoral announcements from material designed to imitate them.
The IEC's latest warning does not ask voters to avoid political information.
Instead, it urges them to verify what they encounter before accepting or sharing it.
For an election in which digital communication will play an increasingly important role, that distinction could become an important part of how South Africans navigate the campaign and prepare to vote.
JD GLOBAL MEDIA will continue monitoring developments surrounding the 2026 Local Government Elections, including IEC announcements, campaign rules, disinformation cases and other major electoral developments.
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